This paper looks at two features of globalization, namely productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their e¤ect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous …rms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons unrelated to adverse terms of trade e¤ects, we show that there is good reason to expect improvements in a partner's productivity to hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one if it is backward enough.
Introduction
Should a country welcome productivity improvements in its trading partners or should it be apprehensive? Should all countries welcome falling trading costs or are their welfare e¤ects asymmetric across countries with some gaining and others losing? This is a question of fundamental importance today as globalization results in the spread of technology from the North to the South and falling trade costs and trade barriers improve market access.
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y Departmant of Economics, the Pennsylvania State University, 608 Kern Graduate Building, University Park, PA 16802. email: sad257@psu.edu lose. We argue below, that though there are always gains from trade, improvements in a partner's productivity hurt us (for a new and di¤ erent reason) and falling trade costs may hurt the laggard country while helping the advanced one.
Traditional trade models (whether Ricardian or a variant of Heckscher-Ohlin) o¤er the basic insight that gains from trade arise when a country faces prices di¤erent from its autarky prices. Thus, aside from distributional issues, these models suggest that, ceteris paribus, one would prefer to trade with a country that is di¤erent rather than a country which is similar, and with a large country rather than a small one. Moreover, these models suggest that improvements in a trading partners productivity will bene…t a country. For example, in the standard Ricardian model with a continuum of goods, productivity improvements by a trading partner raise the welfare of all agents as they weakly raise the real income of domestic labor, the only factor, in terms of each and every good. See Dornbush, Samuelson and Fischer (1977) . 1 Also, a fall in trading costs tends to raise welfare as the price of imports falls which raises the real income of labor in terms of each good.
In a richer version of the Ricardian model, Krugman (1986) argues that technological catch up by the followers may hurt the leaders, while technological progress by the leaders helps all countries. The results follow from a combination of terms of trade and real income e¤ects. Progress in the follower country results in greater competition with the leaders exports. This has adverse terms of trade e¤ects for the leader which creates the possibility of welfare losses for the leader. However, technological improvements by the leader raise welfare in both countries. Though the leader su¤ers adverse terms of trade e¤ects, the productivity improvements more than compensate for them, while the follower country gains since the price of the technologically advanced goods it imports falls. These adverse terms of trade e¤ects are one way for exogenous changes such as productivity improvements or falling trade costs to reduce welfare. However, this is not the channel by which we obtain our results.
Monopolistic competition models with economies of scale where countries have access to the same technology (for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985) ) o¤er a further insight into the e¤ects of trade and technological change. Trade increases market size, which results in a greater variety of products as well as lower prices for the products o¤ered as …rms are better able to exploit economies of scale in large markets. In this manner, trade can improve not just aggregate welfare, but the welfare of all agents. 2 However, even in these models, the size of countries plays a crucial role in the determination of gains from trade: the larger the trading partner, the greater the increase in market size due to trade and the greater the gains from trade. In this model, productivity improvements in a trading partner raise welfare as they raise e¤ective market size! 3 Most recently, Melitz and Ottaviano (2003) highlight the role of market potential in trade. They consider a single factor (labor) monopolistic competition model with …rm level heterogeneity. Countries di¤er in their size and in their trade costs but all …rms, whether domestic or foreign, draw from the same Pareto productivity distribution. In other words, they have access to the same technological possibilities. Their work has implications for the e¤ect of changing country size, unilateral, bilateral and preferential liberalization. They show that the larger country gains more from trade than the smaller one. 4 The larger 2 In the simple HOS model, trade always results in trade-o¤s: some agents gain while others lose. In monopolistic competition models, gains from trade due to variety e¤ects accrue to all consumers. In fact, if countries are close enough in their relative factor availability, these gains swamp any losses from factor price changes. This explains why free trade with a similar country may be welcomed while free trade with a country that is very di¤erent in terms of its endowments is harder to sell. 3 A formal proof that productivity improvements in one country do not hurt its trading partner can be found in Appendix A. 4 This result is reminiscent of the standard variety e¤ects in monopolistic competition.
country has more "market potential" than the smaller one and as a result, is a better export base in the trading equilibrium. Thus, more …rms produce in the larger country, competition is stronger and prices are lower than in the smaller country which is why the larger country gains more from trade. In their model, an increase in the size of a country due to an increase in its labor force raises per capita welfare in the growing country leaving that in its partner unchanged.
Their results on the e¤ects of liberalization are more striking. In standard models, unilateral liberalization is welfare improving in the absence of externalities, second best or pro…t shifting e¤ects. In contrast, they show that unilateral liberalization hurts the liberalizing country while bene…ting others through the market potential e¤ect. Such liberalization makes a country a worse export base so that its market potential is reduced:
…rms prefer to locate behind high trade barriers and export to countries with low trade barriers. The liberalizing country su¤ers a reduction in productivity of domestic …rms and a reduction in domestic variety which is not fully compensated for by increased import variety. In addition, they show that preferential liberalization, like a customs union, raises welfare of the union members at the expense of non union ones. The market potential of the union rises, making it a better export base, with consequent bene…cial e¤ects on productivity and variety.
In this paper yet another insight is o¤ered for monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous …rms. We identify a new e¤ect, the technological potential e¤ect. 5 The technological potential of a country consists of the distribution of productivities its …rms draw from and the impact of this on its competitiveness in the marketplace. The technology a …rm has access to interacts with market conditions to determine the equilibrium distributions of productivity, the extent of competition and variety in equilibrium. We show that if countries have di¤erent technologies available to them, i.e., their …rms draw from di¤erent distributions which are ordered in terms of hazard rate stochastic dominance (HRSD) 6 , and there is no specialization, then productivity improvements in one country raise welfare there but hurt that of its trading partner. The intuition behind our result is the following: the improvement in the technological potential, which occurs when …rms can draw from a "better" distribution of productivities, results in more entrants in the home country, and fewer abroad. Domestic entrants are drawn by the higher expected pro…ts from being an exporter. Competition intensi…es and the cuto¤ productivity level rise so that average domestic …rm productivity rises. Though the number of foreign producers exporting to the home market falls, the surge in the entry of domestic …rms overwhelms it. As a result, consumers at home face a greater variety of products and gain more from trade even though the import of the di¤erentiated goods from abroad decreases. 
The Model
The model is based on that of Melitz (2003) , who extends Krugman's (1980) trade model by introducing …rm level productivity di¤erences. However, all countries in his model are symmetric in terms of the technologies available. 8 This paper allows for the di¤erence in the countries'access to technology so that countries are no longer symmetric. Analytical results, without having to make speci…c distributional assumptions, are derived. Factor price equalization is achieved by introducing a homogenous good in both countries with constant return to scale production technology and zero costs of transportation. We consider an economy with two sectors and one production factor, labor. A homogenous good (the numeraire) is produced in the …rst sector. Firms in the second sector produce a continuum of di¤erentiated goods indexed by z. We model this sector by taking Melitz (2003) as a starting point. Since all the properties of his model remain valid, we will be relatively terse in the presentation of this part.
Preferences
There are L consumers in the economy. Each supplies one unit of labor and has the a utility function given by U = (N ) and . Denote the price of variety z by
It is easy to verify that the cost of a unit of C de…nes the perfect price index
As originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , that the demand for variety z is given by
A simple interpretation is that the demand for a variety is a derived demand, derived from the demand for C: As such, it is the product of the amount of variety z needed to make a unit of C 9 times C.
Using (2) shows that expenditure on variety z;
9 By Shephard's Lemma, the unit input requirement is just the derivative of P with respect to p(z):
dz is the aggregate expenditure on di¤erentiated goods. Note that the share of expenditure on a particular variety depends only on the price of that variety relative to the price index.
Production and Firm Behavior
The homogeneous good is produced under constant returns to scale and one unit of labor makes a unit of this good. Hence, we can normalize the wage rate and the price of the homogenous good in a closed economy unity. Moreover, as long as this good can be traded freely as we assume throughout, prices and nominal wages in both countries are also unity. 10 The expenditure on and (in a closed economy) the revenue earned is denoted by
The labor used in the two sectors is denoted by L N and L C .
The di¤erentiated good sector has a continuum of prospective entrants that are the same ex-ante. To enter, …rms pay an entry cost of f e > 0, which is thereafter sunk. Then they draw their productivity from a common distribution g (') with positive support over (0; 1) and a continuous cumulative distribution G ('). At each point of time, there is a mass, M e ; of …rms that make such a draw. Once a …rm knows its productivity, it can choose to produce or exit. If its productivity draw is below a cuto¤ level, ' , it is best o¤ exiting at once. 11 Any …rm that stays in the market has a constant per period pro…t level.
A …rm exits (due to some unspeci…ed catastrophic shock) with a constant probability in each period. 12 We assume that there is no discounting 13 and consider only stationary equilibria. Note that because exit is random, the productivity distribution for successful entrants, exiting incumbents, and hence, for active …rms is the same.
1 0 Even if unit labor requirements di¤er, factor price equalization in e¢ ciency units is achieved. 1 1 The existence and uniqueness of ' will be shown in Section 5. 1 2 It would be more plausible to make the probability of exit depend on the …rm's productivity. For example, Hopenhayan (1992) models exit caused by series of bad shocks a¤ecting the …rm's productivity. 1 3 Again, this assumption is made for simplicity.
The productivity distribution of successful entrants in the economy is proportional to the initial productivity distribution with the factor of proportionality being the mass of …rms that are alive in the stationary equilibrium denoted by M . In a stationary equilibrium, in every period the mass of new successful entrants should exactly replace the …rms who face the bad shock and exit. As a result, we have the aggregate stability condition:
is the probability of successful entry. In this manner, M e and ' determine M and ' is endogenously determined.
The labor needed to produce q units of a variety is l (') = f + q=': f > 0 is a …xed overhead cost in terms of labor while and 
Hence, pro…ts are
Variable pro…ts are thus a constant share of revenue and this share is greater the less the substitutability between varieties. Also note that
so that a more productive …rm has larger output and revenues, charges a lower price and earns higher pro…ts compared to a …rm with the low productivity level.
Only a …rm with (') 0 will …nd it pro…table to produce once it has entered. A …rm's value function is given by max
is negative, and (') is increasing in ', we can determine the lowest productivity level at which a …rm will produce (the cuto¤ level ' ) by (' ) = 0. Any entering …rm drawing a productivity level ' < ' will immediately exit. Therefore, the distribution of productivity in equilibrium, (') ; is:
Since each …rm produces a unique variety z and draws a productivity '; with a mass M of …rms, the price index is given by
As …rms are symmetric ex-ante, p does not depend on z so that
Recall that p(') = 1 ' and de…ne' 14 as:
so that
As in Melitz (2003) , all aggregate variables can similarly be written in terms of a representative …rm,'; and M:
where
represent aggregate revenue and pro…ts in the di¤erentiated good sector, r and represent the average revenue and pro…t as well as the revenue and pro…t of the …rm with productivity'. Note that this allows a heterogeneous …rm setting to be transformed to a homogenous …rm one where all …rms have productivity':
Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
To derive the productivity cuto¤ level ' in the equilibrium, we use the free entry (FE) condition:
The average pro…t level is a function of
1 (see appendix B).Using this formula in (12) and denoting
we obtain a …nal equation for ' :
where f j(' ; G ( )) is the present discounted value of the expected pro…ts upon entering.
As shown in Melitz (2003) , f j(' ; G ( )) is decreasing in ' and intersects the f e line only once. This ensures the existence and uniqueness of ' . The solution of (13) does not depend on the labor stock in the economy. Moreover, a graphical representation of (13) in Figure 1 provides a simple way to analyze the changes in ' due to changes in the parameters of the model.
Since there are zero pro…ts ex-ante and only one factor, labor, the value added in a sector, or a revenue in this case, equals the value of payments to factors. As a result, the aggregate revenues in both sectors are exogenously …xed by the country size L:
In any period, the mass of …rms which produce di¤erentiated goods, is given by M = R C = r = L= ( ( + f )). Note that the larger the country size L; the more …rms enter the market. As a result, the price index falls and welfare per worker 15 rises due to an increase in product variety.
Analysis of the Equilibrium
Now we turn to the e¤ect of a better productivity distribution.
De…nition 1
The productivity distribution G H (') dominates the productivity distribution G F (') in terms of the hazard rate order, G H ( ) hr G F ( ), if for any given productivity 
. 16 In terms of our model, this means that for any given level ', entrants in the home country with the productivity distribution G H ( ) have a better chance of obtaining a productivity draw above this level than do entrants in the foreign country with the productivity distribution G ( ). Given this di¤erence, we obtain
Proof. See appendix C.
Using Lemma 1 in Figure 2 , we conclude that ' H > ' F . Intuitively, since home …rms have a better chance of obtaining a productivity above any cuto¤ level, only more productive …rms can survive. As a result, the home country has a lower price index and a higher welfare per worker than the foreign country.
Trade has two basic e¤ects in an economy: on the one hand, it provides an opportunity to sell in the new market; on the other hand, it brings new competitors from abroad.
We consider trade with costs: when …rms become exporters, they face new costs, such as transport costs, tari¤s, etc. As in Melitz (2003) , we assume that both countries have the same size and in each country, after the …rm's productivity is revealed, a …rm who wishes to export must pay a per-period …xed cost, f x > 0. Per-unit trade costs are modeled in the standard iceberg formulation: > 1 units shipped result in 1 unit arriving. Regardless of export status, a …rm still incurs the same overhead production cost of f per period.
In order to ensure factor price equalization across countries and to focus our analysis on …rm selection e¤ects, we assume that the homogenous good is produced using the same technology in both countries after trade 17 , and that its export does not incur transport costs. 18 In the next two sections we consider trade with no specialization.
Equilibrium in the Open Economy
In each country under trade, the aggregate revenue earned by domestic …rms in the di¤er-entiated good sector, R C i , can di¤er from the aggregate expenditure on the di¤erentiated
where i is the fraction of labor employed in the di¤erentiated good sector in country i; and
Since consumers in each country spend a share of their incomes on the di¤erentiated goods, and as the world expenditure on the di¤erentiated goods equals the revenues earned in this sector, H + F = 2 . The export price is p x (') = p ('). Using (3), we can write 1 7 This requires 2 < 1: 1 8 = 1 for the homogenous good. 1 9 As in the autarky, the aggregate revenue R C i in the di¤erentiated good sector equals to the total payment to the labor, i.e., R
the revenues earned by a …rm in country i from domestic sales as r i (') = E C i (P i ') 1 , i = H, F , where P i denotes the price index in the di¤erentiated good sector. The revenue of a …rm in country i is r i (') ; if the …rm does not export, and r i (') + r j 1 ' , i 6 = j, if the …rm exports. The actual bundle of goods available can di¤er across countries as not every …rm in each country decides to export.
We assume that G H hr G F and consider stationary equilibria only. Then, in country i, the pro…ts earned by a …rm from sales in the domestic and foreign markets are, respectively,
Total pro…ts can be written as i (') = max f0; di (')g + max f0; xi (')g. As in autarky, the productivity cuto¤ levels must satisfy di (' i ) = 0 and xi (' xi ) = 0. 
Proof. See appendix D.
Note that from Assumption 1 and Lemma 2, A should be more than 1: We depict the results of Lemma 2 in the Figure 3. 21 The productivity cuto¤ level for exporting …rms depends on the price index and the mass of domestic …rms in the country they export to, which, in turn, depend on the productivity cuto¤ level for domestic …rms in this country.
The ex-ante probabilities of successful entry and being an exporter conditional on successful entry are, respectively, p in;i = 1 G (' i ) and 
8' ' i and zero otherwise. Let M i denote the mass of …rms in country i that are alive in the equilibrium. Then the mass of exporting …rms and the total mass of varieties available
Using (9), we de…ne a representative domestic …rm by' i '(' i ; G i ( )) and a representative exporting …rm by' xi '(' xi ; G i ( )). The average revenue and pro…t in country i are
For each country we can write all aggregate variables in terms of' ti 22 , where:
Then;
As in autarky , the FE condition for country i is
ti is a productivity level of the representative …rm in country i. Note that in contrast to Melitz (2003) , ri 6 = ri (' ti ) and i 6 = i (' ti ) because of asymmetric countries.
Using the same technique as before, we can show that
For the time being, denote j('; G i ( )) by j i ('). Substituting (21) into (18) leads to a system of equations with two unknown variables (see appendix E): of (22) and (23). Moreover, ' F < ' H < ' xH < ' xF .
Proof. The sketch of a proof is following. 23 First, for any productivity levels ' H and ' F ; we express ' H as a function of ' F ; using (22) and (23):
Then, we can plot both functions in the same …gure and …nd the equilibrium pair (' H ; ' F )
as an intersection of two curves. Note that both curves are decreasing in ' F and for any pair of distributions G H ( ) and G F ( ) ; G H ( ) = G F ( ) ; the curve corresponding to equation (24) is ‡atter than the curve corresponding to equation (25). Moreover, the intersection of two curves lies on the 45 0 line as shown in Figure 4(a) .
Finally, we can show that if the productivity distribution in a country improves (worsens) in terms of HRSD, the curve corresponding to the equation for this country becomes ‡atter (steeper) and shifts up (down). In particular, if the home country has a better distribution in terms HRSD (G H ( ) hr G F ( )), the curve corresponding to equation (24) shifts up as shown in Figure 4 (b) and in the equilibrium, ' F < ' H : From Lemma 2, ' xi = A' j ; i 6 = j, which leads us to ' F < ' H < ' xH < ' xF .
The resulting productivity cuto¤ levels are depicted in Figure 3 . Ex-ante, home …rms receive productivity draws from a better distribution. As a result, the home productivity cuto¤ level for surviving …rms, ' H , is higher than ' F . However, while making an export decision, home …rms face less severe competition abroad compared to that faced by foreign …rms in the home country. Thus, ' xH < ' xF .
Given ' H and ' F , we can write the trade balance equation and derive H and F ; the shares of labor in the di¤erentiated good sectors in both countries, as the functions of ' H and ' F : (See appendix H for details.)
Lemma 4 If Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold, then the home country imports the homogenous good and exports the di¤ erentiated goods. The foreign country also exports the di¤ erentiated goods, but unlike the home country, it exports the homogenous good as well.
Proof. See appendix H.
Having ' H and ' F ; we obtain i and
. In turn, this determines the price index and the mass of variety available in each country. Note that from (17), the price index in country i depends on the average productivity there,' ti , and the mass of variety available, M ti . In turn, M ti depends on' ti and the productivity cuto¤ level
This allows us to write P i as a function of ' i (see equation (40)) and the welfare per worker as:
Thus, comparative advantage in the di¤erentiated good sector at home (a better distribution in terms of HRSD) leads to a greater technological potential and a higher welfare per worker at home than abroad. 24 Note that a fall in the per-unit trade cost as a consequence of globalization shifts both curves corresponding to equations (24) and (25) up and makes them steeper. As a result, ' H (and, consequently, ' xF ) increases. 25 However, as shown in Figure 5 , ' F (and, consequently, ' xH ) may increase or decrease. In other words, there is a possibility of welfare loss in the less developed country. Intuitively, when identical countries draw from the same distribution, as in Melitz (2003), we know that a fall in trade costs raises both countries welfare. A fall in transport costs creates more export opportunities, which intensi…es competition, and this raises the cuto¤ level and hence welfare. However, this result is crucially dependent on symmetry all around. As everything is continuous, when countries draw from similar distributions, Melitz (2003) result must go through. However, when countries draw from very di¤erent distributions, the backward one can lose. All …rms lose a part of their domestic market, but exporting …rms more than make up for this loss.
However, when home …rms are more advanced, the home market is a tougher one for foreign …rms than vice versa. Hence, home …rms expand at the expense of foreign ones. As not all …rms export, the productivity cuto¤ level (and hence welfare) at home rises while that abroad falls. Now, we obtain our …rst result:
Proposition 1 In the absence of specialization, falling trade costs raise welfare in the advanced country. The laggard country may gain or lose: it must gain if it is not too di¤ erent from its trade partner and can lose if it is very backward. 26
Proposition 1 o¤ers an explanation of why globalization may adversely a¤ect developing countries whose technology is likely to be dominated by that of the developed world.
Trade and Productivity Improvement
How does technological progress in a country a¤ect its trading partner? What is the e¤ect of productivity improvement in a trading partner on welfare in each country? To answer this question, we use the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 4: productivity improvement in terms of HRSD in the foreign country ‡attens the curve corresponding to equation (25) and shifts it up as shown in Figure 6 (a). Thus, we proved Lemma 5:
Lemma 5 In the absence of specialization, the productivity improvement in terms of HRSD in the foreign country raises ' F and ' xH = A' F ; and reduces ' H and ' xF = A' H : 27
The interpretation of this result is that when the foreign country faces the productivity improvement, …rms there have a better chance of receiving a high productivity draw. 2 6 An example of the decrease of ' F in the case of the Pareto distribution is shown in appendix L. 2 7 Productivity improvements may result in Assumption 1 and/or Assumption 2 being violated. Note that we exclude this case from our analysis as we assume both Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold true after the productivity improvement. However, there exist parameter values where the entire range depicted in Therefore, some foreign …rms with low productivity levels, which survive before, exit and ' F rises. As for the home country, a more competitive foreign market decreases the present discounted value of the expected pro…ts of …rms at home. Thus, fewer …rms enter the market and the productivity cuto¤ level ' H falls.
In the absence of specialization, in both cases trade occurs according to Lemma 4.
Productivity improvement in the foreign country leads to the fall in the volume of trade.
In particular, the home country produces and exports fewer di¤erentiated goods and the foreign country produces and exports less homogenous good. (See appendix J.)
The productivity improvement in the foreign country raises the technological potential there while reducing it at home. Hence, the foreign country gains from its technological progress, and the home country loses. Note that using the same technique, we can show that technology improvement in the home country makes the gap between the countries larger. (See Figure 6(b) .) Thus, the foreign country loses. An explanation of why we have this result, which, as pointed out earlier, is at odds with usual intuition, is that productivity improvement at home increases welfare there because more …rms enter the market and Foreign country specializes in the homogenous good production the variety of products at home rises. However, in the foreign country, consumers face a fall in the variety available. 28 Proposition 2 summarizes our main results.
Proposition 2 In the absence of specialization, productivity improvement in one country raises the productivity cuto¤ level there while reducing it in the other country. As a result, consumers in the country, which makes the progress and raises its technological potential, gain, while consumers in the other country lose.
Figure 7 depicts our conclusion about the relationship between welfare per worker in the foreign country and the technological level of its trading partner. We show that in the absence of specialization, productivity improvement in the home country decreases welfare per worker in the foreign country: a fall in the domestic variety in the foreign country is not fully compensated for by the increase in the importing variety from abroad. Thus, while the home country gains from its productivity improvement, the foreign country loses.
The next section presents the results of the trade with specialization. 2 8 An increase in MtH and a decrease in MtF can be shown analytically or by using simulations.
Open Economy: Specialization
As was shown in Section 5.2, productivity improvement in the leading home country or productivity deterioration in the less developed foreign country raises the share of the home country in the production of the di¤erentiated goods. At some point, the gap between the two countries becomes large enough to make the foreign country specialize in the homogenous good, while the home country produces and exports the di¤erentiated goods 29 , and the productivity cuto¤ levels for domestic producers and exporters there, ' H and ' xH , determine the price indices, volume of trade, and welfare in both countries. (For a complete description of the equilibrium see appendix K.) A di¤erence between trade with no specialization and the case in this section is that now welfare at home does not depend on the productivity distribution in the foreign country and the foreign country gains from productivity improvement at home. This increase in welfare in the foreign country is shown in the right part of Figure 7 . The horizontal part in Figure 7 corresponds to the case of the home country specialization in the homogenous good, in which the welfare in the foreign country depends only on its own productivity distribution.
Results for Pareto Productivity Distribution.
In this section we will show that in the case of the Pareto productivity distribution the assumption of HRSD can be relaxed by using the usual (…rst order) stochastic dominance (USD) instead. 30 Assume that the Pareto productivity distribution is given by
, where ' > ' min;i , k i > 1; i = H; F: The hazard rate for the Pareto distribution is
i.e., the productivity 2 9 In terms of our model, this means that H = 2 and F = 0. 3 0 Note that HRSD implies USD, however, the opposite is not always true.
distribution in the home country dominates that in the foreign country in terms of HRSD,
, then lemmas 3 and 4 and propositions 1 and 2 can be used to describe the equilibrium in the economy and the e¤ects of productivity improvements and a fall in trade cost on welfare in both countries.
We need to consider the case when k H = k F = k; but ' min;H > ' min;F ; i.e., the productivity distribution in the home country dominates that in the foreign country in terms of USD, however, the productivity distributions in both countries are equivalent in terms of HRSD. In this case the system of equilibrium equations can be written as
Using similar techniques as before, it can be shown straightforwardly that the properties of the system of equations (27) and (28) Thus, in the case of the Pareto productivity distribution, the assumption of HRSD can be replaced by the assumption of USD and the results remain the same.
Conclusion
We develop a stochastic, general equilibrium model of international trade between two asymmetric countries, one of which has a comparative advantage over another in terms of the productivity distribution. We derive our results without resorting to simulations or imposing strong restrictions on the model. We show that in the absence of specialization, falling trade costs may hurt the laggard country while helping the advanced one. Moreover, productivity improvement in one country increases its technological potential and welfare but hurts its trading partner. In contrast, if a country is the only producer of the di¤erentiated goods (the other one specializes in the homogenous good), then its welfare does not depend on the productivity distribution in the di¤erentiated good sector abroad and the laggard country gains from productivity improvement in the advanced country.
Appendix A Let's consider the same model as one described in this paper, but now assume that in each country, …rms are homogeneous and the only di¤erence between two countries is in the technology used to produce the di¤erentiated goods: in country i, all …rms have the same productivity level ' i and cost function is given by l (
Assume that …rms at home are more productive than those in the foreign country: ' H > ' F . We assume that there is a free entry and only the …rms, which produce in the domestic market, can export. Trade with no specialization is possible if 1 f x = f . By using the same technique as in this paper, we can show that welfare in country i is given by
, where
. Thus, in the absence of specialization, productivity improvement in country i (' i increases) raises the welfare there but does not change the welfare of its trading partner. Moreover, in the case of specialization, productivity growth in country i is bene…cial to both countries.
Appendix B
By de…nition, (' ) = r(' ) f = 0 or r (' ) = f: From (7), r (') = r (' )
Appendix C Using (9), we can write j (' ; G i ( )) as
Thus, for any given level ' ,
. Then we have:
Thus,
Appendix E As in autarky, substituting (21) in (18) for each country leads to the system:
Using the de…nition of j i (') and Lemma 2, we obtain (22) and (23) from the system above.
Appendix F
. As a result, formula (17) can be written as
Appendix H
Given ' H and ' F , we can write the trade balance equation
By using M i = R C i r i = i L= r i , i = H; F , in the trade balance equation (41) and denoting
by b i , we obtain the following expression for H :
By construction, F = 2 H :
To prove that H > (home country exports the di¤erentiated goods), we need to show that b H b F > 1 and b F > b H . Using formula (40) and given that r i (') = E C i (P i ') 1 , we obtain: a H ( ), or, respectively, " F and " H , and prove that " F > " H .
HRSD implies that
1 G H (') . Thus, g F (') =a F (') > g H (') =a H ('), " F > " H , b F > b H , and H > . Thus, is small enough, i.e., if the technological di¤erence between the two countries is large enough, then the foreign country loses from the falling trade costs. Otherwise, it gains. It remains to check that this need not violate (1) the implicit assumption being made that some …rms exit, i.e., ' i ' min;i , and (2) the assumption of non specialization. (1) implies
Note that making f e large enough prevents specialization from occurring. When f = 2000; f x = 2500; f e = 2000; = 0:025; = 3; k = 2:2; ' min;H = 100; ' min;F = 71;
decreases from 1:5 to 1:45; it can be veri…ed that both hold.
